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The
Hijacking
"WE HAVE SOME PLANES"
Tuesday, September 11,
2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern United
States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for work.
Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures
of the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to
Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River,
the United States Congress was back in session. At the other end
of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to line up for a White House
tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bush went for an
early morning run.
For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have
been better for a safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers
were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the
airport in Portland, Maine.
1.1 INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS
Boarding the Flights
Boston: American 11 and United 175. Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00
A.M. flight from Portland to Boston's Logan International
Airport.1
When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by
a computerized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System), created to identify
passengers who should be subject to special security measures.
Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of
Atta's selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off
the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft.
This did not hinder Atta's plans. 2
Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later,
Atta apparently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime
colleague who was at another terminal at Logan Airport. They spoke
for three minutes.3
It would be their final conversation.
Between 6:45 and 7:40, Atta and Omari, along with Satam al Suqami,
Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in and boarded
American Airlines Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles. The flight was
scheduled to depart at 7:45.4
In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad,
Mohand al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in
for United Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles. A
couple of Shehhi's colleagues were obviously unused to travel;
according to the United ticket agent, they had trouble
understanding the standard security questions, and she had to go
over them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring
answers.5
Their flight was scheduled to depart at 8:00.
The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta
and his colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were
operated by Globe Security under a contract with American
Airlines. In a different terminal, the single checkpoint through
which passengers for United 175 passed was controlled by United
Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to perform the
screening.6
In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers would
have been screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to
detect items with at least the metal content of a .22-caliber
handgun. Anyone who might have set off that detector would have
been screened with a hand wand-a procedure requiring the screener
to identify the metal item or items that caused the alarm. In
addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the hijackers'
carry-on belongings. The screening was in place to identify and
confiscate weapons and other items prohibited from being carried
onto a commercial flight.7
None of the checkpointsupervisors recalled the hijackers or
reported anything suspicious regarding their screening.8
While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members
of his hijacking team-Suqami, Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri-were
selected in Boston. Their selection affected only the handling of
their checked bags, not their screening at the checkpoint. All
five men cleared the checkpoint and made their way to the gate for
American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami took their seats in business
class (seats 8D, 8G, and 10B, respectively). The Shehri brothers
had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A,Waleed in 2B), in the
first-class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40.
The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 7:40. 9
Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS,
boarded United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, Shehri
in 2B, Shehhi in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C, and Ahmed al Ghamdi in
9D).Their aircraft pushed back from the gate just before 8:00.10
Washington Dulles: American 77. Hundreds of miles southwest of
Boston, at Dulles International Airport in the Virginia suburbs of
Washington, D.C., five more men were preparing to take their early
morning flight. At 7:15, a pair of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and
Majed Moqed, checked in at the American Airlines ticket counter
for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles. Within the next 20 minutes,
they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers, Nawaf al
Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.11
Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by
CAPPS. The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by
the air-line's customer service representative at the check-in
counter. He did so because one of the brothers did not have photo
identification nor could he understand English, and because the
agent found both of the passengers to be suspicious. The only
consequence of their selection was that their checked bags were
held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded
the aircraft.12
All five hijackers passed through the Main Terminal's west
security screening checkpoint; United Airlines, which was the
responsible air carrier, had contracted out the work to
Argenbright Security.13
The checkpoint featured closed-circuit television that recorded
all passengers, including the hijackers, as they were screened. At
7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the security checkpoint.
Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the
X-ray machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both
set off the alarm, and they were directed to a second metal
detector. Mihdhar did not trigger the alarm and was permitted
through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off, a screener wanded
him. He passed this inspection.14
About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77,
Hani Han-jour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the
Main Terminal's west checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm,
through the metal detector. A short time later, Nawaf and Salem al
Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi cleared the
metal detector and was permitted through; Nawaf al Hazmi set off
the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was
then hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his
over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an explosive trace
detector and then passed. The video footage indicates that he was
carrying an unidentified item in his back pocket, clipped to its
rim.15
When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) later investigated these security
screening operations, the screeners recalled nothing out of the
ordinary. They could not recall that any of the passengers they
screened were CAPPS selectees. We asked a screening expert to
review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the quality
of the screener's work to have been "marginal at best."
The screener should have "resolved" what set off the
alarm; and in the case of both Moqed and Hazmi, it was clear that
he did not.16
At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and
were seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to
seat 1B (first class), soon followed.The Hazmi brothers, sitting
in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the first-class cabin.17
Newark: United 93. Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed
al Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the
United Airlines ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los
Angeles. Two checked bags; two did not. Haznawi was selected by
CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded
on the plane.18
The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by
United Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright
Security. Like the checkpoints in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit
television surveillance so there is no documentary evidence to
indicate when the hijackers passed through the checkpoint, what
alarms may have been triggered, or what security procedures were
administered. The FAA interviewed the screeners later; none
recalled anything unusual or suspicious.19
The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had
seats in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class
section. Jarrah was in seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was
in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi in 6B.20
The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights.21
They were planning to hijack these planes and turn them into
large guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of jet
fuel. By 8:00 A.M. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001,
they had defeated all the security layers that America's civil
aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.
The Hijacking of American 11
American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from Boston
to Los Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First
Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767. It carried its
full capacity of nine flight attendants. Eighty-one passengers
boarded the flight with them (including the five terrorists).22
The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to
26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of
29,000 feet. All communications and flight profile data were
normal. About this time the "Fasten Seatbelt" sign would
usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have
begun preparing for cabin service.23
At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication
with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions
from the FAA's air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen
seconds after that transmis-sion, ATC instructed the aircraft's
pilots to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequent
attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. From this
and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or
shortly thereafter.24
Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong
and Madeline "Amy" Sweeney, tell us most of what we know
about how the hijacking happened. As it began, some of the
hijackers-most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who
were seated in row 2 in first class-stabbed the two unarmed flight
attendants who would have been preparing for cabin service.25
We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the
cockpit; FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and
locked during flight. Ong speculated that they had "jammed
their way" in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed the flight
attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to open the
cockpit door, or to lure the captain or first officer out of the
cockpit. Or the flight attendants may just have been in their
way.26
At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta-the only terrorist on
board trained to fly a jet-would have moved to the cockpit from
his business-class seat, possibly accompanied by Omari. As this
was happening, passenger Daniel Lewin, who was seated in the row
just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed by one of the
hijackers-probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated directly behind
Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an officer in the Israeli
military. He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in
front of him, not realizing that another was sitting behind him.27
The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper
spray, or some other irritant in the first-class cabin, in order
to force the passengers and flight attendants toward the rear of
the plane.They claimed they had a bomb.28
About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted
the American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary,
North Carolina, via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency
aboard the flight. This was the first of several occasions on 9/11
when flight attendants took action outside the scope of their
training, which emphasized that in a hijacking, they were to
communicate with the cockpit crew. The emergency call lasted
approximately 25 minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed
information about events taking place aboard the airplane to
authorities on the ground.29
At 8:19, Ong reported: "The cockpit is not answering,
somebody's stabbed in business class-and I think there's Mace-that
we can't breathe-I don't know, I think we're getting
hijacked." She then told of the stabbings of the two flight
attendants.30
At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong's call in
North Carolina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines
operations center in Fort Worth, Texas, reaching Craig Marquis,
the manager on duty. Marquis soon realized this was an emergency
and instructed the airline's dispatcher responsible for the flight
to contact the cockpit. At 8:23, the dispatcher tried
unsuccessfully to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air
traffic control specialist in American's operations center
contacted the FAA's Boston Air Traffic Control Center about the
flight. The center was already aware of the problem.31
Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because just
before 8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the
passengers. The microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the
hijackers said, "Nobody move. Everything will be okay. If you
try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the airplane.
Just stay quiet." Air traffic controllers heard the
transmission; Ong did not. The hijackers probably did not know how
to operate the cockpit radio communication system correctly, and
thus inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic
control channel instead of the cabin public-address channel. Also
at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy Sweeney got through to the
American Flight Services Office in Boston but was cut off after
she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight. Three minutes
later, Sweeney was reconnected to the office and began relaying
updates to the manager, Michael Woodward.32
At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was "flying
erratically." A minute later, Flight 11 turned south.
American also began getting identifications of the hijackers, as
Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of those
who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit.33
Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been
hijacked; a man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight
attendants had been stabbed-one was seriously hurt and was on
oxygen while the other's wounds seemed minor; a doctor had been
requested; the flight attendants were unable to contact the
cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit. Sweeney told
Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information
as they could to people on the ground.34
At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically
again. Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers
were Middle Easterners, naming three of their seat numbers. One
spoke very little English and one spoke excellent English. The
hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit, and she did not know
how. The aircraft was in a rapid descent.35
At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under
the impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first
class. Other flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting
medical supplies while Ong and Sweeney were reporting the
events.36
At 8:41, in American's operations center, a colleague told Marquis
that the air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking
and "think he's [American 11] headed toward Kennedy [airport
in New York City].They're moving everybody out of the way. They
seem to have him on a primary radar. They seem to think that he is
descending."37
At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About
this same time Sweeney reported to Woodward," Something is
wrong. We are in a rapid descent . . . we are all over the
place." Woodward asked Sweeney to look out the window to see
if she could determine where they were. Sweeney responded:
"We are flying low. We are flying very, very low. We are
flying way too low." Seconds later she said, "Oh my God
we are way too low." The phone call ended.38
At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World
Trade Center in New York City.39
All on board, along with an unknown number of people in the tower,
were killed instantly.
The Hijacking of United 175
United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los Angeles
at 8:00. Captain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael
Horrocks piloted the Boeing 767, which had seven flight
attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight.40
United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan
Airport at 8:14. By 8:33, it had reached its assigned cruising
altitude of 31,000 feet. The flight attendants would have begun
their cabin service.41
The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked,
and at 8:42 the United 175 flight crew completed their report on a
"suspicious transmission" overheard from another plane
(which turned out to have been Flight 11) just after takeoff. This
was United 175's last communication with the ground.42
The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46.They used
knives (as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant),
Mace (reported by one passenger), and the threat of a bomb
(reported by the same passenger). They stabbed members of the
flight crew (reported by a flight attendant and one passenger).
Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant).The
eyewitness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the
plane, from passengers originally seated further forward in the
cabin, a sign that passengers and perhaps crew had been moved to
the back of the aircraft. Given similarities to American 11 in
hijacker seating and in eyewitness reports of tactics and weapons,
as well as the contact between the presumed team leaders, Atta and
Shehhi, we believe the tactics were similar on both flights.43
The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on
United 175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes
twice within a minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated from its
assigned altitude, and a minute later New York air traffic
controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully trying to contact
it.44
At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson received a
phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His son
told him: "I think they've taken over the cockpit-An
attendant has been stabbed- and someone else up front may have
been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United
Airlines-Tell them it's Flight 175, Boston to LA." Lee Hanson
then called the Easton Police Department and relayed what he had
heard.45
Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in
San Francisco, reaching Marc Policastro. The flight attendant
reported that the flight had been hijacked, both pilots had been
killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, and the hijackers
were probably flying the plane. The call lasted about two minutes,
after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsuccessfully to
contact the flight.46
At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City.47
At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call
his wife, Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine
that the plane had been hijacked. He then called his mother,
Louise Sweeney, told her the flight had been hijacked, and added
that the passengers were thinking about storming the cockpit to
take control of the plane away from the hijackers.48
At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter:
It's getting bad, Dad-A stewardess was stabbed-They seem to have
knives and Mace-They said they have a bomb-It's getting very bad
on the plane-Passengers are throwing up and getting sick-The plane
is making jerky movements-I don't think the pilot is flying the
plane-I think we are going down-I think they intend to go to
Chicago or someplace and fly into a building-Don't worry, Dad- If
it happens, it'll be very fast-My God, my God.49
The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just
before it cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so
did Louise Sweeney. Both then saw the second aircraft hit the
World Trade Center.50
At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of
the World Trade Center.51
All on board, along with an unknown number of people in the tower,
were killed instantly.
The Hijacking of American 77
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from
Washington Dulles for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a
Boeing 757 piloted by Captain Charles F. Burlingame and First
Officer David Charlebois. There were four flight attendants. On
September 11, the flight carried 58 passengers.52
American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at
8:20. At 8:46, the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude
of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have begun. At 8:51, American
77 transmitted its last routine radio communication. The hijacking
began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 11 and United 175, the
hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger) and moved all
the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft
(reported by one flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike the
earlier flights, the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a
passenger to have box cutters. Finally, a passenger reported that
an announcement had been made by the "pilot" that the
plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts
mentioned any stabbings or the threat or use of either a bomb or
Mace, though both witnesses began the flight in the first-class
cabin.53
At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning
south. Two minutes later the transponder was turned off and even
primary radar contact with the aircraft was lost. The Indianapolis
Air Traffic Control Center repeatedly tried and failed to contact
the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also tried, without
success.54
At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey
learned that communications had been lost with American 77.This
was now the second American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all
American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had not taken off
to remain on the ground. Shortly before 9:10, suspecting that
American 77 had been hijacked, American headquarters concluded
that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might have
been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing a
plane, American Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop
nationwide.55
At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She
said her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had
moved them to the rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert
American Airlines. Nancy May and her husband promptly did so.56
At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her
husband, Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States.
She reported that the flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers
had knives and box cutters. She further indicated that the
hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put
all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a minute into
the conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson
tried unsuccessfully to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft.57
Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband
again. She reported that the pilot had announced that the flight
had been hijacked, and she asked her husband what she should tell
the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location and she
replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another
passenger told her they were traveling northeast. The Solicitor
General then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and
crashes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicate
any awareness of an impending crash. At that point, the second
call was cut off.58
At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft
was at 7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the
Pentagon.59
At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control
"observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high
rate of speed." This was later determined to have been Flight
77.
At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the
Secret Service of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of
the White House. American 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of
the Pentagon and began a 330-degree turn. At the end of the turn,
it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon
and downtown Washington. The hijacker pilot then advanced the
throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.60
At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon,
traveling at approximately 530 miles per hour.61
All on board, as well as many civilian and military personnel in
the building, were killed.
The Battle for United 93
At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New
Jersey) Liberty International Airport bound for San Francisco. The
aircraft was piloted by Captain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy
Homer, and there were five flight attendants. Thirty-seven
passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the plane. Scheduled
to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757's takeoff was delayed
because of the airport's typically heavy morning traffic.62
The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at
7:45 (American 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10
(American 77). Three of the flights had actually taken off within
10 to 15 minutes of their planned departure times. United 93 would
ordinarily have taken off about 15 minutes after pulling away from
the gate. When it left the ground at 8:42, the flight was running
more than 25 minutes late.63
As United 93 left Newark, the flight's crew members were unaware
of the hijacking of American 11.Around 9:00, the FAA, American,
and United were facing the staggering realization of apparent
multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would see another aircraft
strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at the FAA and the
airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft.64
At the same time, Boston Center realized that a message
transmitted just before 8:25 by the hijacker pilot of American 11
included the phrase, "We have some planes."65
No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with
multiple hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere
in the world in more than 30 years, and never in the United
States. As news of the hijackings filtered through the FAA and the
airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to their leadership
that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too
might be at risk.66
United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness of
that hijacking began to spread after 8:51. American 77 was
hijacked between 8:51 and 8:54. By 9:00, FAA and airline officials
began to comprehend that attackers were going after multiple
aircraft. American Airlines' nationwide ground stop between 9:05
and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines ground stop. FAA
controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked the first two
hijackings, requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command Center
"get messages to airborne aircraft to increase security for
the cockpit." There is no evidence that Herndon took such
action. Boston Center immediately began speculating about other
aircraft that might be in danger, leading them to worry about a
transcontinental flight-Delta 1989-that in fact was not hijacked.
At 9:19, the FAA's New England regional office called Herndon and
asked that Cleveland Center advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit
security.67
Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air
carriers' responsibility to notify their planes of security
problems. One senior FAA air traffic control manager said that it
was simply not the FAA's place to order the airlines what to tell
their pilots.68
We believe such statements do not reflect an adequate appreciation
of the FAA's responsibility for the safety and security of civil
aviation.
The airlines bore responsibility, too. They were facing an
escalating number of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous
reports about other flights, as well as a continuing lack of vital
information from the FAA about the hijacked flights. We found no
evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any cockpit
warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. United's first decisive action
to notify its airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not
come until 9:19, when a United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger,
took the initiative to begin transmitting warnings to his 16
transcontinental flights: "Beware any cockpit intrusion- Two
a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center." One of the flights
that received the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was
still responsible for his other flights as well as Flight 175, his
warning message was not transmitted to Flight 93 until 9:23.69
By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93's cross-country
trip proceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were
normal. Heading, speed, and altitude ran according to plan. At
9:24, Ballinger's warning to United 93 was received in the
cockpit. Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pilot, Jason Dahl,
responded with a note of puzzlement: "Ed, confirm latest mssg
plz-Jason."70
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above
eastern Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds
into the descent, the FAA's air traffic control center in
Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the
aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer
could be heard declaring "Mayday" amid the sounds of a
physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio transmission,
35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The
captain or first officer could be heard shouting:" Hey get
out of here-get out of here-get out of here."71
On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United
93-33 in addition to the 4 hijackers. This was below the norm for
Tuesday mornings during the summer of 2001. But there is no
evidence that the hijackers manipulated passenger levels or
purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation.72
The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11
operated in five-man teams. They initiated their cockpit takeover
within 30 minutes of takeoff. On Flight 93, however, the takeover
took place 46 minutes after takeoff and there were only four
hijackers. The operative likely intended to round out the team for
this flight, Mohamed al Kahtani, had been refused entry by a
suspicious immigration inspector at Florida's Orlando
International Airport in August.73
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers
on the plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the
hijackers had been able to use the cockpit jump seat from the
outset of the flight. FAA rules allow use of this seat by
documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier or FAA
personnel. We have found no evidence indicating that one of the
hijackers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the
hijackers had assigned seats in first class, and they seem to have
used them. We believe it is more likely that Jarrah, the crucial
pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated and
inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized; and once inside,
he would not have been visible to the passengers.74
At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make
the following announcement to the passengers of Flight
93:"Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, please sit down
keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit."
The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah
then instructed the plane's autopilot to turn the aircraft around
and head east.75
The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely
a flight attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She
struggled with one of the hijackers who killed or otherwise
silenced her.76
Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series
of calls from GTE airphones and cellular phones. These calls
between family, friends, and colleagues took place until the end
of the flight and provided those on the ground with firsthand
accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical
information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into
the World Trade Center.77
At 9:39, the FAA's Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center
overheard a second announcement indicating that there was a bomb
on board, that the plane was returning to the airport, and that
they should remain seated.78
While it apparently was not heard by the passengers, this
announcement, like those on Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended
to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta earlier, may have inadvertently
broadcast the message because he did not know how to operate the
radio and the intercom. To our knowledge none of them had ever
flown an actual airliner before.
At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers
knew that passengers were making calls but did not seem to care.
It is quite possible Jarrah knew of the success of the assault on
the World Trade Center. He could have learned of this from
messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits of its
transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning of cockpit
intrusion and telling of the New York attacks. But even without
them, he would certainly have understood that the attacks on the
World Trade Center would already have unfolded, given Flight 93's
tardy departure from Newark. If Jarrah did know that the
passengers were making calls, it might not have occurred to him
that they were certain to learn what had happened in New York,
thereby defeating his attempts at deception.79
At least ten passengers and two crew members shared vital
information with family, friends, colleagues, or others on the
ground. All understood the plane had been hijacked. They said the
hijackers wielded knives and claimed to have a bomb. The hijackers
were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passengers to the
back of the aircraft.80
Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two
people were lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or
dead-possibly the captain and first officer. One caller reported
that a flight attendant had been killed.81
One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought
the hijackers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers
reported the presence of a firearm. One recipient of a call from
the aircraft recounted specifically asking her caller whether the
hijackers had guns. The passenger replied that he did not see one.
No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was found
at the aircraft's crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives
no indication of a gun being fired or mentioned at any time. We
believe that if the hijackers had possessed a gun, they would have
used it in the flight's last minutes as the passengers fought
back.82
Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers' claim of
having a bomb. The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives
at the crash sites. One of the passengers who mentioned a bomb
expressed his belief that it was not real. Lacking any evidence
that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such illegal items past
the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs were
probably fake.83
During at least five of the passengers' phone calls, information
was shared about the attacks that had occurred earlier that
morning at the World Trade Center. Five calls described the intent
of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt against the
hijackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush
the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided,
and acted.84
At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had
terminated phone calls with loved ones in order to join the
revolt. One of the callers ended her message as follows:
"Everyone's running up to first class. I've got to go.
Bye."85
The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger
assault muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family
members who listened to the recording report that they can hear
the voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify whose
voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained.86
In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the
left and right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At
9:58:57, Jarrah told another hijacker in the cockpit to block the
door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply left and
right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed
tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to
disrupt the assault. The recorder captured the sounds of loud
thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates. At
10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.87
Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, "Is that it? Shall we
finish it off?" A hijacker responded, "No. Not yet. When
they all come, we finish it off." The sounds of fighting
continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of
the aircraft up and down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the
background said, "In the cockpit. If we don't we'll
die!" Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, "Roll
it!" Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00
and said, "Allah is the greatest! Allah is the
greatest!" He then asked another hijacker in the cock-pit,
"Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?" to which the
other replied, "Yes, put it in it, and pull it down."88
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker
said, "Pull it down! Pull it down!" The hijackers
remained at the controls but must have judged that the passengers
were only seconds from overcoming them. The airplane headed down;
the control wheel was turned hard to the right. The airplane
rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting
"Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest." With the
sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft
plowed into an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580
miles per hour, about 20 minutes' flying time from Washington,
D.C.89
Jarrah's objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the
American Republic, the Capitol or the White House. He was defeated
by the alerted, unarmed passengers of United 93.
Credit: The 911 Commision Report
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm
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